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INDISCERNABILITY SKEPTICISM1
Steven Luper, Trinity University

Ideally, our account of knowledge would help us to understand the appeal of (and flaws
in) skepticism,2 while remaining consistent with our ‘intuitions,’ and supporting
epistemic principles that seem eminently plausible. Of course, we don’t always get what
we want; we may not be able to move from intuitions and principles to an account that
fully squares with them. As a last resort, we may have to move in the other direction, and
give up intuitions or principles that are undermined by an otherwise compelling account
of knowledge, so as to achieve ‘reflective equilibrium.’3 But last resorts come last.
As is well known, Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick devised accounts of
knowledge that perform well as measured by two of these three expectations. Their
‘tracking’ theory (to apply Nozick’s term to both Dretske’s and Nozick’s analyses) seems
intuitive and it allows us to offer an intriguing explanation of skepticism.4 However,
their view forces us to reject the principle of closure, even qualified extensively. As far
as I know, no one accepts the following stark version of the closure principle:
If S knows p, and p entails q, then S knows q.
This principle implies—falsely—that S knows q even if S does not believe q or realize
that q follows from p. Nevertheless, the closure principle, suitably restricted, seems too

1

I thank Curtis Brown and Peter Klein for helpful suggestions about an earlier draft.
Several people have emphasized this point or something like it. E.g., Robert Nozick (1981) writes, “an
account of knowledge should illuminate skeptical arguments and show wherein lies their force” (p. 197).
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Goodman 1955; Rawls 1971, p. 20.
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Dretske 1970, Nozick 1981; cf. Goldman (1976), who develops a tracking account of perceptual
knowledge.

2

1

obvious to give up; because tracking theorists reject it even when thoroughly qualified,
several writers have attempted to improve upon the tracking theorists’ approach.
In particular, contextualists have offered a way of coming to terms with
skepticism without giving up the principle of closure. However, in my view we should
not accept their approach, for its disadvantages outweigh its advantages. First, according
to contextualists, thinking about skepticism destroys our knowledge. Only people who
ignore skepticism know anything, and even they lose their knowledge if skeptical
possibilities are brought up. Second, while contextualism is consistent with some
plausible epistemic principles, it forces us to reject others, such as this metalinguistic
version of the closure principle:
If person S correctly attributes to herself knowledge that p, then if S had believed
q by deducing q from p, S would have been correct to attribute to herself
knowledge that q.
Fortunately, there is no need to say that thinking about its implications destroys our
knowledge, and no need to give up closure, even on the metalinguistic level. There is an
intuitively compelling account of knowledge that helps us to understand the problem
with—and appeal of—leading forms of skepticism, and that squares with plausible
epistemic principles: the indicator analysis.5 We can meet our three expectations fully.
To defend these claims, I’ll review the tracking and indicator analyses, and show
that the latter handles skepticism at least as well as the former yet sustains closure. Then
I’ll consider the contextualist account, and suggest that it is inconsistent with plausible
epistemic principles, and cannot handle skepticism as well as the indicator approach.
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I.

TRACKING V. THE INDICATOR ACCOUNT

Consider rough and somewhat oversimplified versions of the theories offered by Dretske
and Nozick:
Dretske:

A person S knows p if and only if there is a reason R such that:
S’s belief p is based on the fact that R holds, and
not-p  not-(R holds).6

Nozick:

A person S knows p if and only if there is a method M such that:
S believes p via M, and
not-p  not-(S believes p via M).7

Simplifying even more, I am going to ignore the differences between these two
approaches, and lay out a bare-bones version of the tracking account of knowledge. S
knows p if and only if there is a reason R such that (using ‘T’ for ‘tracking theory’):
(T1)

S’s belief p is based on the fact that R holds

(T2)

not-p  not-(R holds).

What I have set forth is the heart of the tracking view. But now consider a simple
modification, in which we replace (T2). S knows p if and only if there is a reason R such
that:
(1)

S’s belief p is based on the fact that R holds

(2)

R holds  p.8
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Luper 1984, 1987; Sosa 1999.
Dretske 1971 puts his condition as follows: where R is the basis for S’s belief that P, S knows that P is
true if and only if “R would not be the case unless P were the case.”
7
Nozick formulates his account on p. 179 of Nozick 1981; in the text, I simplified his third condition, and
ignored the fourth.
8
Note that the truth condition would be redundant, since
R holds
(which is implied by (1)), together with
R holds  p
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Condition (2) is just the contrapositive of (T2). So (2) and (T2) must amount to the same
thing, right?
Tracking v. Indication
No; in fact, the contrapositives of subjunctive conditionals are not equivalent, and while
(2) and (T2) work similarly in many cases, they differ in crucial ways. Consider a case in
which they converge and a case in which they diverge.
Convergence first. In one of his examples, Dretske asks you to imagine that you
are at a perfectly ordinary wildlife show, standing in front of a cage marked ‘zebra’.
There are no Cartesian demons lurking in the wings, no Gettieresque surprises waiting to
spring themselves at you. You are looking right at the zebra inside, and you come to
believe z: the animal in the cage is a zebra. The source of your belief is a familiar
empirical test by which you examine a scene and see if you get zebra-in-a-cage-type
experiences; you take having these experiences to indicate that z is true, and not having
them to indicate that z is false. You meet (T2): in the close worlds in which z is false,
you do not have zebra-in-a-cage-type experiences. You also meet (2): in the close
worlds in which you have these experiences, z is true.
Now divergence. Suppose you use zebra-in-a-cage-type experiences as your basis
for believing not-m: the animal in the cage in front of me is not a mule cleverly disguised
to look just like a zebra. That is, you take getting zebra-type experiences to indicate that
not-m is true. You fail to meet (T2). (T2), applied to not-m, requires that
m  S does not get zebra-type experiences.

entail
p.
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And in the close worlds in which the animal is a zebra-like mule, you still have zebratype experiences, leading you to think that the animal is not a zebra-like mule. Yet you
will meet (2). Applied to not-m, (2) requires that
S gets zebra-type experiences  not-m.9
In the actual world we are imagining, you are in an ordinary wildlife show looking at a
caged zebra. In such a world, and in close worlds where you get zebra-like percepts, you
are led to think the animal is not a zebra-like mule, and, of course, in these worlds the
animal isn’t.
So (T2) is not equivalent to (2), even though both are met in many of the same
cases.
Tracking, Indication, and Closure
Perhaps (T2) and (2) are distinct, but isn’t (T2) preferable to (2)? Won’t Dretske and
Nozick insist that seeming to see a zebra does not position us to know that we are not
looking at a zebra-like mule, and that it only positions us to know that we are looking at a
zebra? But when they say these things we know what comes next: they deny the
principle of closure of knowledge under entailment, and say you cannot know that the
animal in the cage is a not a made-up mule even if you deduce it from something you
admittedly know—namely, that it is a zebra. Why do they reject closure? Consider
condition (T2). Let us say that when a true belief meets (T2), it tracks the fact that p via
9

The point of condition (2) is to require that p be true in the R-holds-neighborhood of the actual world.
But, as Peter Klein reminded me, if we require that this neighborhood be very extensive, the condition is
too strong. To use an example Jonathan Vogel (1987) used against Nozick, suppose I left a tray of ice
cubes in the sun an hour ago, and believe, correctly, and for obvious reasons, that they have melted.
Nonetheless, there is a world in which someone put the cubes back in the freezer without telling me; if we
define the relevant neighborhood so that this world is in it, I fail to meet condition (2), for in that world I
will still have my reasons for believing the cubes have melted, even though they are frozen. In my view, if
there is someone standing by seriously considering putting the tray back into the freezer, or someone who
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R. Here’s the main problem: a belief can track the fact that p via some reason R without
tracking p’s logical consequences. So we can know a claim is true, believe things that
follow, yet fail to know that those things are true.10 Dretske’s zebra case illustrates the
point.11
I assume that incompatibility with the principle of closure counts heavily against
an analysis of knowledge, while compatibility counts in its favor. Hence before we
decide on the relative merits of (2) versus (T2), it is important to see that (2) supports
closure. Let us say that when belief p meets (2), R is an infallible indicator that p is true
(or, more fully, we might say that, relative to S’s situation, R is an infallible indicator that
p is true). If R is an infallible indicator that p is true, as (2) requires, then R is also an
infallible indicator that p’s logically consequences are true. If
R holds  p
p entails q
hold, then it must also be the case that

just might do so, then I do not know the ice has melted. However, those who disagree can weaken (2),
even to the point where it requires only that in S’s situation as it was when R held, p is true.
10
Consider the following inference:
(a)
not-p  not-(R holds)
(b)
p entails q
(c)
So: not-q  not-(R holds).
It is not valid, because the following is not a valid pattern of inference:
1. not-p  not-q
2. p entails r
3. So: not-r  not-q
Nor is the following, which commits the fallacy of contraposition twice:
1. not-p  not-q
2. q  p (from 1—fallacy of contraposition)
3. p entails r
4. q  r (from 2,3 by strengthening the consequent)
5. not-r  not-q (from 4—fallacy of contraposition).
11
Actually, it is not obvious that we should reject closure if we accept the tracking account. As I point out
in footnote 32, if we track p via some fact, say R, and believe q by deducing it from p, then we track q via
p. We track q if we take p itself as our basis for believing q. We will deny closure only if we insist that
knowing q entails tracking q via R, the fact via which we track p. But why say that? For other doubts
about Nozick’s case against closure, see various essays in Luper (1987a).
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R holds  q
is true.12 So if my belief p is based on a reason R that is an infallible indicator that p is
true, and I come to believe q by deducing q from p, then my belief q is also based on a
reason that is an infallible indicator that q is true--namely R, or R plus the fact that p
entails q (we could even say that the reason q is based on is p itself). For example, my
zebra experiences are situationally infallible indicators that the animal in the cage is a
zebra: in the close worlds in which I have these experiences, I’m seeing a zebra. But all
the worlds in which I’m seeing a zebra are worlds where what I’m seeing is not a
disguised mule. The upshot is that while tracking is hostile to closure, infallible
indication is not.13
Even when strengthened in various ways, the indicator analysis will sustain
closure. This is fortunate, since our account does need to be refined and clarified in
various ways. We cannot go into all of these, but one adjustment seems especially
important, since conditions (1)-(2) can be met in cases in which our belief’s source is
(generally) unreliable. To make this point clear, let’s tinker with one of Goldman’s
examples. We’ll play a prank on Sue, a wacko who takes highly realistic barn
appearances to indicate the presence of papier-mâché copies of barns. The prank is
innocent enough: we bundle her off to a region of the world in which all the real barns
12

The inference pattern here is strengthening the consequent, which is valid:
1. p  q
2. q entails r
3. So: p  r
13
Our thesis applies directly to Nozick’s tracking account, too. Consider the following revision of his view
(contraposing his third condition, and leaving out the first, which is redundant): S knows p if and only if
there is a method M such that
S believes p via M, and
S believes p via M  p.
Suppose S knows p via M1, and believes q by deducing q from p. Then there is a method M2 via which S
believes q such that
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have been replaced with papier-mâché duplicates. When she spots a papier-mâché barn
in the distance, her visual impressions lead her to think that she’s looking at a papiermâché barn. Here’s the point: the fact that she has barn-type percepts is, then and there,
an infallible indicator that she sees a papier-mâché barn, so she meets our two conditions
for knowledge. Given her peculiar circumstances, if she were to see barn appearances, a
papier-mâché barn would be present. Yet she does not have knowledge. She takes
highly realistic barn appearances to indicate the presence of papier-mâché barns, but barn
appearances are not generally reliable indicators of papier-mâché barns (instead, realistic
barn appearances are reliable indicators of barns). Generally, in the situations in which
we have barn appearances, we are not confronted with papier-mâché barns.
These considerations suggest the need to add the following to our list of
conditions for knowledge (naturally, those who are not convinced by the example can get
by without the addition):
(3) Generally, when an R-type situation holds, a p-type situation holds.
Let us say R is a reliable indicator that p is true if and only if this condition is met.
Requiring a reliable indicator does not stop us from accepting closure. If R is a
reliable indicator that p is true, and p entails q, R is also a reliable indicator that q is true.
(I’m assuming that to identify a p-type situation, we start with the situation described by
p and abstract away the element of time, and that if p entails q, then when a p-type
situation holds, a q-type situation must also hold.) Now,
- Generally, when an R-type situation holds, a p-type situation holds
- p entails q

S believes q via M2  q,
--namely, arriving at belief p via M1 and believing q by deducing q from p.
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together entail
- Generally, when an R-type situation holds, a q-type situation holds.
So if S’s belief p is based on a reason R that reliably indicates that p is true, and S
believes q by deducing q from p, then S’s belief q will be based on a reason that reliably
indicates that q is true. By contrast, the tracking counterpart of (3), namely
(T3)

Generally, when a p-type situation does not hold, an R-type situation does

not hold,
will not support closure.14
The fact that conditions (1)-(3) endorse closure, while their tracking counterparts
do not, is prima facie grounds for preferring the former. Nonetheless, Dretske and
Nozick would probably argue that the tracking condition (T2) is preferable to the
indication condition (2) precisely because the former positions us to acknowledge our
ignorance of skeptical hypotheses, which gives us a way to account for skepticism.
Skepticism seems correct because skeptical conclusions can be reached using the closure
principle. As for where skepticism goes wrong, we can blame the closure principle itself:
skeptics assume it, but it is false. Is this response plausible?
Tracking and Skepticism
It is plausible. Some versions of skepticism do rely on closure. An example is the
following skeptical argument from closure:
(i)

If S knows p, and believes q by deducing q from p, then S knows q.

14

Apply it to Dretske’s zebra case. z meets (T3): when we are not confronted with zebras, generally we do
not get zebra-type experiences that might lead us to suspect the presence of zebras. Furthermore, z entails
not-m. But not-m does not meet (T3): on those (rare) occasions when we are confronted with mules
disguised as zebras, generally we get zebra-type experiences, indicating that not-m is true. (But recall the
sort of reservation expressed in notes 11 and 32.)
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(ii)

But S does not know that S is not a brain in a vat on a planet far from earth
whose sensory experiences are completely misleading. (S does not know
this because S does not track the fact that S is not a brain in a vat.)

(iii)

So S does not know anything that entails that S is not in the vat scenario
(including most of S’s ordinary beliefs).

Of course, the skeptical argument from closure constitutes a form of indiscernability
(Cartesian) skepticism, and has nothing to do with regress (Pyrrhonian) skepticism. By
denying closure, tracking theorists leave regress skepticism untouched, and address only
one form of indiscernability skepticism. A response to one skeptical argument is not
necessarily a response to others. But progress is made if one prominent form of
skepticism is defeated. And I think that this is a substantial virtue of tracking accounts.
As powerful as the above response is, we can reject it if we provide an account of
knowledge that sustains closure yet explains the appeal of skepticism while pinning down
the flaw in the argument from closure. And in fact we have such an account: knowledge
as indication. We already know that (1)-(3) support closure. And, as I will explain later,
we can locate the flaw in the skeptic’s argument at step (ii): by the conditions of the
indicator analysis, we know we are not brains in vats. We can even explain the appeal of
skepticism--in much the same way as the tracking theorists do. Let me elaborate.
Why One Form of Skepticism is Appealing
I begin with a concession. Dretske’s and Nozick’s story is basically the right explanation
of the appeal of (one form of) skepticism. This is true even though the tracking account
is wrong and the indication account is right. Skepticism is appealing because people
often think of knowledge as tracking. They think of knowledge as tracking because
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knowledge closely resembles tracking.15 It is easy to conflate (2) with its tracking
counterpart (and (3) with its tracking counterpart), and if we do, we are likely to
believe—falsely—that to know we are not brains in vats we must track the fact that we
are not brains in vats. We will then disavow knowing we are not brains in vats. So even
if (1)-(3) are the correct conditions for knowledge, and we do know we are not brains in
vats, at least part of the explanation of why skepticism is tempting is surely that we do
not track the fact that we are not in skeptical scenarios. We also see our way past the
temptation: we can see through the skeptical argument from closure by familiarizing
ourselves with the differences between tracking and indication, and carefully applying
(1)-(3) rather than the tracking counterpart.
At this point Dretske and Nozick might well object. Perhaps (2) closely
resembles (T2), and perhaps people run the two conditions together, but aren’t these
points grounds for concluding that the ordinary notion of knowledge can be captured only
if we adopt both sets of conditions? If so, we are back to an analysis that undermines
closure, and we seem forced to accept the tracking theorists’ account of skepticism in its
entirety.
This objection has substantial merit, but it can be overcome. True, in conflating
indication with tracking, people might end up insisting on both. But it is more likely that
people who conflate the two shift back and forth from one to the other, using the first on
some occasions and the second on other occasions, oblivious, all the while, to the
equivocation. There is plenty of evidence that people equivocate in this way. For
example, consider the fact that we vehemently cling to the principle of closure. It is
when we interpret knowledge as indication that we adopt this principle. We would not
15

Luper 1984; Sosa 1999.
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adopt it if we accepted all of the conditions or just the tracking conditions by themselves.
Consider, too, how natural it is for people to claim to know a possibility does not hold on
the grounds that the possibility is remote, and sometimes they stick to their guns even
when we point out that they do not meet the tracking requirement. On the other hand,
sometimes they will not stick to their guns: perhaps then they are worried about tracking.
I admit that it is difficult to pin down the ordinary concept of knowledge, and
show that I have it right while Dretske and Nozick have it wrong. I do not have a
knockdown case against the tracking theorists. We should not expect too much from
‘intuitions’ and appeals to the ordinary concept of knowledge; anyone familiar with postGettier attempts to analyze knowledge realizes that ‘intuitions’ and language analysis do
not always provide the means to choose among competing accounts. When this happens,
however, we can defend a view on the grounds that it refines the ordinary conception of
knowledge.16 And in that spirit I recommend the indicator analysis. Indication improves
upon the commonsense concept of knowledge, for, unlike the ordinary notion, it
unambiguously sustains the principle of closure.
Where Our Skeptical Argument goes Wrong
Still another objection is available. On the view I have offered, we know we are not
brains in vats. Surely, tracking theorists might insist, we can know no such thing—about
that, at least, skeptics are correct. And anyone who disagrees needs to explain how such
knowledge is possible. This challenge seems fair enough, and I think it can be met. At a
minimum, I can make my position as plausible as Dretske’s and Nozick’s. That is, the
combination,

16

Compare Quine’s (and Carnap’s) notion of explication in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” p. 25 of Quine
1953.
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(a) I know I am not a brain in a vat, and
(b) I know ordinary claims that are incompatible with being a brain in a vat,
my view, is at least as plausible as the combination,
(a) is false, yet
(b) is true,
which is their view.
Consider what, specifically, is involved in knowing that a skeptical possibility
does not hold. I know that
h: I am sitting in my house typing out an essay
is true. My reason R1 for believing h is my having certain familiar sensory experiences,
relating to my house and computer, and these are infallible (and reliable) indicators that h
is true. Furthermore, h entails
not-biv: I am not a brain in a vat on a far-off planet whose experiences are
completely misleading.
Seeing this, I believe not-biv. And I have an infallible reason for believing not-biv,
namely, R1--my having the experiences on which I based belief h. Of course, if asked
why I believe not-biv, I will likely answer that my belief is based on a compound reason:
the fact that h is suggested by the experiences involved in R1 together with the fact that
not-biv follows from my belief h. (Alternatively, I might say that my reason for believing
not-biv is h itself.) No matter: this complex reason (or h by itself) is itself an infallible
(and reliable) indicator that I am not a brain in a vat on a far-off planet.
What might make us suspicious about knowing not-biv is the fact that normally
our grounds for it (like our grounds for many other claims, as G. E. Moore (1959) pointed
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out) are indirect.17 Just now, when I explained the typical way in which we know that
not-biv, I mentioned one source (R1—involving experiences of sitting at the keyboard
and so on) for the commonsense belief h, and a compound source for not-biv. We base
commonsense beliefs directly on experience; why can’t we base beliefs about skeptical
possibilities directly on experience? Why must the latter be based on the commonsense
beliefs instead? Unless we can answer these questions, we will suspect that beliefs about
skeptical possibilities are special—and perhaps that skeptics are right about them.
Fortunately, there are answers.
As to why our grounds against skeptical possibilities typically are indirect, here is
part of the story: suppose I am asked why I believe I am in my house typing right now.
In crafting my answer, I must deal with the fact that I did not go through any explicit
reasoning, or apply any explicit test. I rarely do when perception leads me to believe
things. Nonetheless, I find that certain sorts of familiar experiences habitually trigger
certain sorts of commonsense beliefs. So I can give an answer by laying out the sorts of
experiences that typically trigger beliefs about typing, buildings, and so on. But the
belief that I am not a brain in a vat is not one I ordinarily entertain, hence it is not
possible to link it with experiences that habitually trigger it. It rarely comes up. But
when it does, I find myself believing it because I see that it follows from my
commonsense beliefs.
Here is another part of the story: suppose I clarify the ways I arrive at perceptual
beliefs by explicitly crafting rules of the form, if I have experiences E, then p is true. For
example: If I get zebra-in-a-cage-type experiences, then the statement, ‘There is a zebra
in the cage’ is true. Such rules explicitly address a particular statement. But they need
17

Cf. Richard Feldman (1999, p. 105).
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not explicitly address claims that follow from this statement. Clearly, my rules can say
that a claim p is true without (explicitly) saying that p’s consequences are true.18 In a
fairly straightforward sense, a thermometer (made out on a Fahrenheit scale) that
registers 70 degrees says it is 70 degrees Fahrenheit, but not that the temperature is not 0
degrees Celsius. Nonetheless, we can know the latter indirectly, since the one fact entails
the other. The upshot is that my experiences can be infallible (and reliable) indicators
that I am at home, and that I am not a brain in a vat on a distant planet, yet I might fail to
have belief management rules which prompt me to believe I am not in a vat on the basis
of my experiences.
Finally, let me address the claim that we must base beliefs about skeptical
possibilities indirectly on commonsense beliefs, and not directly on experience. This
claim is false. There is nothing to stop us from converting what is usually indirect
knowledge into direct knowledge. I can simply take, as my reason for believing that it is
not 0 Celsius, the fact that a Fahrenheit thermometer says that it is above 32. And I can
know I am not a brain in a vat directly on the basis of the experiences that led me to
believe that I am at home typing, rather than by inferring I am not in a vat from this
belief.
One other potential criticism should be addressed. Lately, some philosophers
apply the label ‘Moorean,’ disparagingly, to any attempt to say that we can know
skeptical possibilities do not hold. The thought is that Moore merely turned the tables on

18

This does not threaten closure. Suppose our source R for believing p does not address one of p’s
consequences q. Suppose also that we know that p is true and we believe that q is true by deducing it from
p. Then our source for believing q is: seeing that q follows from p which is itself indicated by R, and this
compound source is a reliable and infallible indicator that q is true.
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the skeptic, without describing where the skeptic goes wrong. Such critics might try to
dismiss my own efforts in the same way. I have two reactions.
First. Moore’s demonstration that the tables can be turned on the skeptic is itself
important. All of us who are not clinging to skepticism find Moore’s antiskeptical
argument19 at least as powerful as the skeptic’s argument from closure. Second. Unlike
Moore, I have explained what is involved in knowing that skeptical possibilities do not
hold. I have not just asserted that the skeptic’s argument fails. Skepticism can be
resisted even if we grant the closure principle, however qualified. The key is the
Mooresque claim that we know skeptical scenarios do not hold.

II.

CONTEXTUALISM V. THE INDICATOR ACCOUNT

Let’s turn to the contextualists’ explanation of skepticism, and begin by confronting a
possible source of confusion: those of us who defend subjunctive accounts, whether we
view knowledge as tracking or as indication or the like, have always thought that
knowledge depends on the knower’s context. Yet we are not contextualists—not, in any
case, as that term is usually meant these days. In what ways do the two approaches
overlap, and how do they differ?
Subjunctive Accounts and Contextual Variables
For the subjunctivist, it is a straightforward matter that our status as knowers depends on
features of our situation. In some circumstances a belief source R must be especially
versatile to generate knowledge. To be a reliable indicator, R must display a minimal
19

His antiskeptical argument is this:
(i)
I know all sorts of commonsense claims: I am in my house typing an essay, and so on.
(ii)
If I know these things that are incompatible with being a brain in a vat, then I know I am not a
brain in a vat.
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level of reliability, but to be a situationally infallible indicator, R often must do still
better, depending on the specific nature of the circumstances at hand. In optimal
conditions I can know I see a barn by looking at it. If there are papier-mâché barns
scattered through the area, however, I can look right at a barn, recognize it as a barn, and
still not know that it is a barn. I will need to become (or employ) a better barn detector. I
will need to walk inside the barn, or touch it, or the like. I will need a belief source that,
even in the presence of fake barns, would indicate the presence of a barn only if there
were one there, and the more undetectable the fakes in my vicinity, the abler my source
must be at detecting the fakes.
The point holds for noninferential as well as inferential knowledge. If our belief
is noninferential—if, for example, it is perceptual—then the more deceptive our
circumstances, the more acute our perceptual process must be.20 If inferential, then the
more deceptive our circumstances, the better our evidence must be. It is easy to imagine
circumstances in which I can know the butler did it on the basis of evidence involving an
honest eyewitness. But this evidence will not suffice if it turns out that the butler has a
twin brother with a grudge against the victim. The required discriminatory powers of our
knowledge-producing belief sources varies on a sliding scale, starting with a minimal
level in ordinary circumstances, and rising with the level of deceptiveness of our
situation.21
The element of contextualism evident in subjunctivist accounts of knowledge
allows us to explain and put aside a skeptical argument that is quite different from the
skeptical argument from closure. The argument—from the situation principle—is this:

(iii)
So I know I am not a brain in a vat.
20
Assuming for the sake of argument that perception is a noninferential process.

17

(i)

If, in some situation, E is the evidence we have about p, and we know p on
the basis of E, then we know p in any situation in which E is our evidence
and we believe p on the basis of E. (Call this the situation principle.22)

(ii)

For virtually any evidence E, there are circumstances in which we will not
know p on the basis of E. (There are circumstances in which E is the
evidence we have about p, and we believe p on the basis of E, yet fail to
know p. That is, nearly all of our belief sources fail to produce knowledge
in some circumstances.)

(iii)

So our evidence rarely positions us to know anything.

Reflection about Gettier cases reveals what is wrong with the situation principle.23 When
I look at a caged zebra at an ordinary wildlife show, I know the animal is a zebra. Yet in
the Gettierized version of this situation, where I stumble into the Hey Presto wildlife
show, featuring zebra doppelgangers, I fail to know, even though my belief source is the
same in both cases. But there is no mystery here. What is going on is that a belief source
that is discriminatory enough in ordinary circumstances is not discriminatory enough in
others. The situation principle has to go.
Agent-Centered Contextualism v. Speaker-Centered Contextualism
According to the subjunctivist as well as the contextualist approach, it is harder to know
things in some circumstances than in others--our epistemic apparatus must be more
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Luper 1986.
A weaker principle is also false: if, in some situation, the evidence we have about p is the fact that E
holds, and we know p on the basis of E, then we know p in any situation in which E is our evidence and we
base belief p on the fact that E holds. Goldman’s papier-mâché barn case tells us how to construct a
counterexample.
23
Luper 1987b. For more on aligning Gettier cases with skeptical scenarios, see Luper 1984.
22
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versatile in some circumstances in order to produce knowledge.24 Both accept a view we
might call agent-centered contextualism, which claims that whether it is correct to
attribute knowledge to a given agent S depends on features of S’s context. But
subjunctivists and contextualists diverge when it comes to a further issue. The latter
usually defend a position we might call speaker-centered contextualism,25 which says
that whether it is correct for a speaker to attribute knowledge to a given agent depends on
features of the speaker’s context. Whether I, the speaker, am right when I say that Mary,
the agent I am discussing, knows p, depends on my context, as opposed to Mary’s (it
could also depend on Mary’s context, too—this is not ruled out by definition). The truth
conditions for knowledge attributions vary with speakers’ contexts. Thus when I say
Mary knows p, and you, referring to the same person, say Mary does not know p, we can
both be correct—we are not contradicting each other. Subjunctivists acknowledge that
all sorts of features of a speaker’s context might affect whether she will say (or be
warranted in saying) that an individual knows something. But subjunctivists typically
deny that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions vary with speakers’ contexts.
Hereinafter, I’ll use the term ‘contextualism’ to refer to speaker-centered contextualism.
The Contextualist Explanation of Skepticism
So how do contextualists deal with skepticism? Their approach has two parts: a
diagnosis (accounting for the appeal of skepticism), and a cure.
Here’s the diagnosis. When skeptics discuss their hypotheses with us, they put us
into a special context; there, we may correctly attribute knowledge to an agent S only if S
meets very demanding epistemic standards. These are so rigorous that it is almost always
24

In this sense subjunctivists have always accepted a claim contextualists have been emphasizing lately:
the standards knowers must meet vary with context.
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a mistake to attribute knowledge to anyone (whether ourselves or others). So there is an
element of truth in skepticism, according to contextualists: when we discuss skeptical
possibilities, we enter a context where heightened standards apply, forcing us to conclude
that no one knows that skeptical possibilities do not hold. Because skepticism prevails in
this special context, skeptics think their view must be accepted: Surely if we have to
deny anyone knowledge when pressed by skeptics, then we have to deny anyone
knowledge period—we have to deny it when we are not thinking about skepticism. Still,
there is a suppressed assumption here: namely, that proper attributions of knowledge do
not depend on the context of those who judge. The assumption is analogous to the
situation principle:
The context principle: if it is correct for judges in one context to attribute
knowledge to an agent S, then it is correct for judges in any context to attribute
knowledge to S. (If it is improper for judges in one context to attribute
knowledge to S, then it is improper for judges in any context.)26
Fully spelled out, then, the skeptic’s argument (from the context principle) is this:
(a)

The context principle is true.

(b)

People who raise skeptical doubts create a context in which they must say
that no one knows very much.

(c)

So everyone, regardless of her context, must say that no one knows very
much.
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For example, Unger 1984 and 1986, Cohen 1988, 1991 and 1999, DeRose 1995, and Lewis 1996.
If challenged about this principle, a skeptic might respond that those who deny it are probably confusing
it with a principle other skeptics adopt: the situation principle, used in the skeptical argument from the
situation principle. One might defend the argument from the context principle without defending the
argument from the situation principle. Alternatively, skeptics might claim that their critics are confusing
the context principle with the following warranted assertability principle, which is also false: if a judge in

26
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Now the contextualists’ cure: the skeptic’s argument is no good because the
context principle on which it relies is false. What skeptics fail to see (what they deny?) is
that the epistemic standards that are appropriate for knowledge attributions vary from
context to context. In ordinary contexts, we may attribute knowledge to a given agent S
when S meets quite low epistemic standards. So in ordinary contexts it is correct to say
that people know ordinary knowledge claims. Skeptics think that by getting us to admit
ignorance in the special context they create when they raise their doubts, they can show
that everyone is ignorant regardless of context. But people who ignore skepticism and
skeptical possibilities are in a context where lower standards are in place, and it is correct
for them to attribute knowledge to themselves and to others who ignore skepticism.
The upshot is that contextualists can say that skeptics are more right than they are
wrong: anyone who discusses skepticism must end up embracing it, while those who
ignore skepticism can escape it. An added bonus is that contextualists do not have to
reject closure, so long as its application is confined to one context at a time. In all
contexts, the principle of closure is correct, but if we shift from one context to another in
the course of applying closure, “all bets are off,” as Lewis (1996) says. This is the error
involved in the skeptical argument from closure; it is also involved in the Moore-style
inversion of the skeptic’s argument.
To make the contextualist approach more concrete, let us outline a version offered
by Keith DeRose (1995). Suppose we ask whether some agent S knows p. And suppose
that sk is the most remote alternative to p that we are considering. Let us say that p’s
DeRose zone is the sphere of possible worlds centered on the actual world that includes

one context is warranted in attributing knowledge to an agent S, then a judge in any context is warranted in
attributing knowledge to S.
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the closest worlds in which p is false. For us to correctly say S knows p, two
requirements must be met. First, S’s belief as to whether p is true must match the fact of
the matter throughout p’s DeRose zone: that is, S must believe p throughout the p
portion of p’s DeRose zone, and not-p throughout the not-p portion of p’s DeRose zone
(DeRose 1995, reprinted in DeRose 1999, p. 206). Second, S’s belief as to whether p is
true must match the fact of the matter throughout not-sk’s DeRose zone.
Using DeRose’s account, let us see how the contextualist will deal with
skepticism. DeRose’s second condition will be hard to meet if sk is a very remote
alternative to p: in a context where skeptical possibilities are raised, knowledge is
difficult to attain. For example, we will not qualify as knowing there is a zebra before us
in a context where the possibility of cleverly disguised mules arises, for there are not-z
worlds in which we believe z within the not-m DeRose zone. So if the context principle
were true, we would be judged to know little in any context. This is the diagnosis of
skepticism. Now the cure: both of DeRose’s conditions easy can be met when skeptical
possibilities do not arise. In an ordinary context, we will count people as knowing there
is a zebra in front of them. So the context principle is false; people can be credited with
knowledge in ordinary contexts.
There you have the contextualists’ story. I will argue that it should be rejected,
since we have already offered a better diagnosis of skepticism as well as a better cure.
Problems with the Contextualists’ Approach
This essay began with three requirements an account of knowledge ought to meet:
(a) It should square with our intuitions about clear examples of knowledge and
ignorance.

22

(b) It should help us to diagnose and cure skepticism.
(c) It should not be in tension with plausible epistemic principles.
Like subjunctivists, contextualists can defend their view on the basis of these
requirements. Their approach to skepticism is superior (they might say) because tracking
theorists reject the principle of closure, thus violating (c), while contextualists need not,
and otherwise the two approaches are fairly evenly matched: both explain the appeal of
skepticism by saying that people do not know that skeptical possibilities fail to hold, and
both say we know about ordinary possibilities, such as that we have arms and legs, so
both look good from the standpoint of (a) and (b).
As for the indicator theorist’s diagnosis of and cure for skepticism, contextualists
would reject it, too, even though it supports closure, as suggested by (c). They would
argue that on our account we know that skeptical possibilities do not hold, and this stops
us from explaining the appeal of skepticism, in violation of (b).
However, this argument is unconvincing. We need not accept skepticism to
account for its appeal. In one form—the argument from the situation principle—
skepticism’s appeal is due to the (limited) charms of the situation principle. This form of
skepticism will be especially irresistible if we confuse the situation principle (which is
false) with the context principle (which is true even while it is denied by contextualists).
In another, skepticism derives from the persistent impression that we must jump-start our
justificatory efforts in a way that seems ruled out by the Pyrrhonian regress argument.
And the skeptical argument from closure has its own source of appeal. As we have
already explained, its attractiveness derives from an error that is very hard to detect and
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avoid--an error that results when we conflate tracking conditions and their non-tracking
counterparts, and conclude that we cannot know that skeptical scenarios don’t hold. 27
Our explanation can be adapted to the metalinguistic level, too, so there is no need
whatever to accept attribution conditions that support skepticism. The view we need is
this: it is correct for a speaker to attribute knowledge that p to agent S if and only if S
meets the indicator conditions for knowing p. On this view, it is easy to explain people’s
hesitation to attribute knowledge when a skeptical scenario sk arises, either for the
speaker or the agent, since they confuse indication with tracking and notice that the
tracking conditions are not met. They then reason: S would not know not-sk, so (by
closure) S does not know ordinary things. Later, when the skeptical possibilities are
ignored, people switch back to the indicator conditions, attribute knowledge accordingly,
and refresh their confidence in the closure principle.
This reasoning shows that our way of dealing with skepticism is at least as
plausible as the contextualists’. Now let’s argue that it is superior.
The main concern is that the contextualists’ approach forces us to reject very
plausible epistemic principles, thus violating (c). All things being equal, we are entitled
to resist a theory that forces us to abandon such principles, as contextualists themselves
say in defense of their view against Nozick and Dretske. In fairness, we must note that
contextualists (or at least David Lewis) have seen this sort of objection coming, but, as
some of Nozick’s critics said, a theorist cannot preclude criticism by being first to point
out the troublesome consequences of his own view. Applying modus ponens does not
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As we have said, the skeptical argument from closure is by no means the only defense of skepticism.
Different errors are involved in some of the other defenses. For example, the argument from the situation
principle is flawed because the situation principle is false.
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stop others from applying modus tollens. Let me mention a couple of principles
contextualists must reject.
The first we might call the principle of stability:
If at time 1 S is correct in saying, ‘I know p at time 1,’ and at time 2 S’s situation
remains the same (as far as possible) except that S thinks of one or more
implications of p, then, at time 2, S will (still) be correct in saying, ‘I knew p at
time 1.’
To see why contextualists reject this principle, let’s use Dretske’s example again. You
are at an ordinary wildlife show, looking at a caged zebra, believing that a zebra is there.
Speaking at time 1, you are correct when you say, ‘I know z’, for you meet the low
epistemic standards in place in this context. A moment later, at time 2, you continue to
believe z on the same basis, but you start thinking through the implications of z; realizing
that z entails not-m, you come to believe not-m thereby. Speaking at time 2, you have to
say that you do not know not-m, and further that you do not know z, for you are now
considering a skeptical possibility, which triggers high standards that are not met by
either belief. Worse: judging at time 2, you have to say that you did not know z at time
1! For you-at-time-1 cannot meet the standards which you-at-time-2 are relying on to
issue correct attributions of knowledge. Thinking through what is implied by your
knowledge destroys your knowledge. More carefully, it destroys your knowledge as
assessed while considering skeptical possibilities: judging at time 2, you will admit that
what you said at time 1 when you uttered the words ‘I know z’ was true (since what you
said was, in effect, that your belief z met the lower epistemic standards in place at time 1)
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but you will be forced to add that you did not know z at time 1 (since you did not meet
the higher standards now in place)!28
Another plausible principle contextualists must reject is a metalinguistic version
of the closure principle:
If S correctly attributes to herself knowledge that p, then if S had believed q by
deducing q from p, S would have been correct to attribute to herself knowledge
that q.29
This principle is extremely plausible, since p must be true if S correctly attributes to
herself knowledge that p, so that if S were to believe q by deducing q from p, q must be
true, too. Yet the contextualist will have to deny this principle. Why? –Back to
Dretske’s zebra case. I know z (the possibility that m not having occurred to me). But
the close worlds in which I deduce not-m from z are worlds in which heightened
standards apply; there, I cannot be said to know not-m. (I cannot be said to know z in
such worlds either, but this does not stop me from knowing z in the actual world.) So the
antecedent of the metalinguistic closure principle is true, while the consequent is false.
Does the contextualist give plausible grounds for denying the metalinguistic
closure principle? I don’t think so. According to the contextualist, S-in-the-actual-world
does not meet the higher epistemic standards applied to S-in-the-hypothetical-worldwhere-S-believes not-m. So what? The fact that actual-S meets the lower epistemic
28

As Curtis Brown pointed out to me, a bizarre consequence of contextualism is that the following
reasoning is invalid:
At time 1 S said ‘I know p.’
What S said was true.
So S knew p at time 1.
29
Here is another metalinguistic closure principle contextualists must deny:
If at time 1 S is correct in saying, ‘I know that p,’ and at time 2 S’s situation remains the same (as
far as possible) except that S comes to believe q by deducing q from p, then, at time 2, S will be
correct in saying, ‘I know that q.’
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standards entails p! Even by the lowest plausible standards, knowing p entails p. So if,
as the antecedent of the metalinguistic closure principle says, S’s knowing z is certifiable
(by weak standards), z must be true, and if S believed not-m by deducing it from z, S
could not be wrong about not-m, even if neither the belief z nor the belief not-m meets the
contextualist’s higher epistemic standards. Truth is preserved from the one context to the
other.
Once we notice that contextualists reject the metalinguistic closure principle, their
solution to skepticism resembles that of the tracking theorists quite a bit. For the skeptic
could draw on the metalinguistic closure principle to offer an argument against all
commonsense knowledge attributions. As follows:
1.

No matter what S’s circumstances are, it is never proper for S to say she
knows that she is not a brain in a vat (not-biv).

2.

So if S were to believe not-biv by deducing it from a claim h that entails
not-biv, she still could not properly say that she knows not-biv, no matter
how well grounded her belief h happens to be.

3.

The metalinguistic closure principle is true.

4.

So S will always be incorrect in attributing to herself knowledge of
anything that entails not-biv.

The contextualists’ response will be that the principle at step 3 is false. But given this
response, do we really want to say their solution to skepticism is better than the solution
offered by the tracking theorists? Tracking theorists confront a skeptic who argues at the
object level; they reject the object level version of the closure principle. Contextualists
simply move up a level, and confront a skeptic who appeals to the metalinguistic closure
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principle. This is progress? Perhaps the metalinguistic closure principle is not quite as
plausible as the principle Dretske and Nozick deny, but isn’t it much too close for
comfort? Both are plausible for similar reasons. Can’t we at least say that we should
avoid denying either if we can? And we can—by using the indicator account as a theory
of both the truth conditions and attribution conditions for knowledge.
A final point: suppose the indicator account of attribution conditions did not
square with our intuitions (if we have any!) about attribution conditions quite as well as
the contextualist account. Suppose that the contest were very close, but lost by the
former. There is a further important consideration against contextualist theories. In the
spirit of revision, it would be much better to adopt the indicator account, for thereby we
avoid the puzzling complications introduced when we say that truth conditions for
knowledge claims vary with the speaker’s context. In particular, our knowledge will not
collapse in epistemic contexts. For the contextualist, knowledge can be correctly
attributed only to people who have overlooked possibilities, and once those possibilities
are looked at squarely, the knowledge attribution must be retracted. Not so on our
account. We can boldly claim to know that skeptical possibilities do not hold, while still
seeing the appeal of many sorts of skepticism. I endorse a remark Lewis30 makes:
It is a Moorean fact that we know a lot. It is one of those things that we know
better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary.
One of those flawed premises is the claim that I do not know I am not a brain in a vat.

III.

30

KNOWLEDGE AND RATIONAL BELIEF

Lewis 1996, p. 220.
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So far we have ignored the issue of how knowledge is related to justified, or rational,
belief. There is not enough space for a full discussion of this matter, but a few comments
are in order.
Knowledge and Nonjustified Belief
First, we ought not to rule out noninferential (hence non-justified yet rational, as opposed
to unjustified and irrational) knowledge; nor does the indicator account do so. If
perception produces noninferential beliefs, it sometimes generates noninferential
knowledge about such things as tables and chairs. Here’s why: In optimal
circumstances, and circumstances that are close to optimal, perception causes me to
believe there is a chair in front of me (or what have you) only if there is a chair.
Moreover, generally, perception is accurate when it leads me to believe in the presence of
chairs (and such).
Knowledge and Rational Belief
Second, we will want to specify that an inferentially known belief p be rational. From an
internalist perspective, this entails that p be sufficiently justified, so that the
preponderance of one’s evidence counts in favor of believing p. Gettieresque concerns
will be handled by (1)-(3), which are externalist conditions. In other words, we can say
that S knows an inferential belief p if and only if S believes p on the basis of some fact R
that provides sufficient justification for p, and R is both a reliable and infallible indicator
that p.
So understood, inferential knowledge is closed under entailment, since we are
justified in believing things that are entailed by individual things we justifiably believe.
That is, the following principle of closure of justification is true:
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If S has sufficient justification for S’s belief p, and S believes q because it follows
individually from p, then S has sufficient justification for S’s belief q.
Our principle is restricted to things that are entailed by individual things we justifiably
believe in order to avoid the lottery paradox, which is generated if we say that we are
justified in believing the conjunctions of things we are justified in believing.31
Many objections to the principle of closure of justification can be met once we
notice two points. First, as Peter Klein (1981) pointed out, our evidence for p need not be
the evidence for p’s consequences. The evidence for the latter might be p itself, which
suffices since p entails its consequences.32 The second point is that evidence against any
of the consequences of p counts against p. So if we are justified in believing p, we will
not have strong evidence against any of p’s consequences, and we will have powerful
grounds for them—namely p.
Needless to say, many theorists will not be satisfied with the above analysis of
knowledge, combining, as it does, internalist with externalist elements. For them, I can
only sketch a few suggestions. The most promising way to clarify the idea of a rational
belief involves developing the notion of belief management practices, which are the
predictable patterns by which each of us adopt, maintain and revise our beliefs. These
belief management practices can be described, at least roughly, in the form of rules. An
example of such a rule might be: accept spontaneously occurring experiential beliefs,
unless they contradict other, firmly accepted beliefs. Such rules need not be consciously

31

A particular lottery ticket has little probability of winning given that the game has many entries. So you
are justified in believing that ticket 1 will lose. Similarly, you are justified in believing that ticket 2 will
lose, and that 3 will lose, and so on. But you are not justified in believing the conjunction of these claims,
which is tantamount to the claim that every ticket will lose.
32
Klein’s point can also be pressed against the tracking theorists’ denial of the closure of knowledge: if we
track p, and believe q by deducing it from p, then we track q if we take p as our basis for believing q.
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applied, and it might be difficult indeed for anyone to fully articulate rules that accurately
capture their practices. Furthermore, some rules may not function to steer us toward an
accurate picture of the world: wishful thinking, for example, preserves assumptions that
make for happiness. We must set these aside in assessing the epistemic status of our
views, and focus on rules used to get us to an accurate picture. (Hereinafter, the term
‘belief management rules’ will refer to the latter.) With these points in mind, and
drawing on the work of Alvin Goldman (1979, 1988), we can offer a characterization of
rationality. Roughly speaking, a person S’s belief p is objectively rational if and only if:
(a) S believes p in conformity with S’s belief management rules
(b) Generally, when S holds a p-type belief in conformity with S’s rules, it is
true.33
The reason: again roughly speaking, a belief is objectively rational if and only if it is
held in conformity with belief management practices that are reliable when they endorse
p-type beliefs. The contrast is with beliefs that are subjectively rational—i.e., held in
conformity with management practices that one accepts for the purpose of arriving at an
accurate picture of the world. (That my belief p is subjectively rational is ensured by (a).)
Thus, a belief is objectively rational when and only when believing it in conformity with
one’s belief management practices is a reliable indicator that it is true.
Steven Luper
Trinity University
33

Certain sorts of objection can be forestalled by qualifying this condition (and the same goes for the
tentative externalist account of inferential knowledge to follow):
Generally, when S holds a p-type belief in conformity with (that subset of) S’s rules, in the
circumstances for which those rules were developed, p is true.
We might also want to refer to S’s community:
Generally, when a member of S’s community holds a p-type belief in conformity with (that subset
of) S’s rules, in the circumstances for which those rules were developed, p is true.
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